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MCDOUGAL-LASSWELL POLICY SCIENCE: DEATH
AND TRANSFIGURATION
Jack Van Doren* & Christopher J. Roederer**
"[No system of]... intellectual strategies... can enable
an applier to dispense with a final creative choice in the rela-
tion of human rights prescriptions, any more. than any other
prescription, to particular instances of human interaction."+
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the death and transfiguration of the legal
paradigm referred to as McDougal-Lasswell Policy Science. This para-
digm asserts those who make legal decisions should decide on articu-
lated policy grounds rather than attempting to make decisions based
merely on rules or principles. The theme centers on the paradox to
which jurists have given different degrees of acceptance. In the United
States domestic scene, it is virtually dead, and in the international law
arena where it is transfigured, it is alive and well.1
* Professor of Law Emeritus, Florida State University College of Law.
** Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. The authors would like to
thank Paul Brest for responding so helpfully to inquiries regarding the relation-
ship between his project on problem solving, decision-making, professional judg-
ment and the Policy Science project. We also thank our research assistant,
Matthew Cicchetti, of Florida Coastal School of Law, for his excellent work on the
present article, and to the Calvin Holloway, Circulation Director at Florida State
College of Law for kindly providing important library services for this project.
We also thank Ms. Sonia Crockett, who provided both encouragement and help in
editing our work. Finally, Professor Roederer would like to thank Florida Coastal
School of Law for supporting this research through a summer research grant.
+ Myres S. McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Con-
tent and Procedures for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L.
387, 405 (1974).
1 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 190, 196, 202 (1995)
(discussing policy science met with rejection on the domestic United States level,
but it currently occupies a place in international law) [hereinafter DUXBURY]. For a
book designed for jurisprudence teachers of policy science, see W. MICHAEL REIS-
MAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW
(1987) [hereinafter REISMAN & SCHREIBER]. For a transposition of policy science to
international law, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter REISMAN ET AL., CONTEMPO.
RARY PERSPECTIVE]. Note that although policy science is relatively alive and well
in international law, it is not at the height it was during the cold war. The interna-
tional law journal at Yale, which was dedicated to New Haven Policy Science
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After further describing the theme and evolution of Policy Sci-
ence, Part II provides a general critique of the McDougal-Lasswell ap-
proach. A treatment of how Policy Science was extended from
domestic law to international law follows in Part III. Part IV discusses
the present status of Policy Science on the domestic front and explores
the multitude of factors that have led to its death in this arena. We
also explore why the same factors have not led to its death on the in-
ternational front. Part V looks to the transfiguration of domestic Pol-
icy Science at the New Haven School of International Law, which,
although alive and well, has a number of serious shortcomings. The
point is not to put nails in the coffin of Policy Science domestically, nor
to undermine the New Haven School of International Law. Rather, we
embrace the Policy Science view that legal positivism is overblown in
the domestic and international legal arenas, that the law is a process,
and that those who make legal decisions cannot escape policy choices.
We remain skeptical, however, that the high level abstractions that
Policy Science advocates offer-such as attempting to maximize
human dignity by maximizing a host of other values such as power,
respect, affection, well-being, skill, rectitude, wealth, and enlighten-
ment-offer anything more than the illusion of certainty.
I. THEME AND EVOLUTION OF POLICY SCIENCE
Prominent Legal Realists, including Professors Thurman Ar-
nold and Edward Robinson, introduced a Policy Science course at Yale
Law School in 1932, which was a major step in the genesis of policy
science.' In 1937, due to the unexpected death of Professor Robinson
and Arnold's move to the New Deal Administration in Washington,
D.C., Myres McDougal was drafted to teach the course.3 Law students
regarded the course with suspicion, labeling it the "cave of the winds,"
which was not a compliment.4
Professor McDougal became a card-carrying Legal Realist in
the early 1930's. At about the same time, conservative legalists intro-
duced the Restatement Movement. The rationale behind the Restate-
scholarship, Yale Studies in World Public Order (1974-80), renamed the Yale Jour-
nal of World Public Order (1980-83), was replaced by the Yale Journal of Interna-
tional Law in 1983. The editor's note on the homepage states: "[olver time, the
journal broadened its focus and began to publish articles from a variety of method-
ological approaches and jurisprudential perspectives, a tendency formalized by the
decision of later editors to change the name of the journal." YALE J. OF INT'L L.,
http://www.yjil.org/about/yale-journal-of-international-law (last visited Jan.17,
2012).
2 DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 165.
3 Id.
4 Id. (citing a letter from McDougal).
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ments was to codify areas of the law such as property and contracts.5
The conservative response sought to introduce order into a proliferat-
ing body of law which Realists and non-Realists alike had found to be
chaotic.6 Displaying his Realist mindset, McDougal attacked the
Harvard Law School-dominated Restatement Movement of the 1930s,
describing it as "fantastic," meaning not only that the legalists at-
tempting it would fail, but also that the project was a fantasy.7 The
conservative legalists counterattacked Legal Realists for focusing too
much on the "is" in single cases, instead of looking at a uniform course
of behavior.' This emphasis, they argued, neglected the degree of cer-
tainty achieved through rule and form.9 The rational element was
more important than the Realists thought.1 ° Other critics of Realism
found it lacking because it too strongly separated "the is" and "the
ought," thereby neglecting the ethical dimensions of law.1 1
Later in the 1930's, McDougal began to take aspects of the cri-
tiques on Realism more seriously. Although McDougal remained im-
patient with the Legal Positivism underlying the Restatement
Movement, 2 he thought Realism lacked a positive program. Thus,
McDougal teamed up with sociology Professor Harold Lasswell to cre-
ate a social science-based policy science.13 The program they devel-
oped was significantly different from the Positivist Restatement
Movement. Rather than attempting to "restate" the law, their pro-
5 Jack Van Doren, A Restatement of Jurisprudence: Why Not?, 44 GONZ. L. REV.
159, 160-62 (2008-2009).
6 Id. at 162-64.
7 Id. at 163.
8 See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697,
707-98 (1931) (attacking the Realist position); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1222-56
(1931) (defending Realism).
9 Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 1231 (stating that Pound believes that the quest for
certainty produces general security).
10 Id. at 1230.
" See generally LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 13, 60, 61 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2009) (1940) (discussing the aspirational character of law
and the unhappiness with Legal Realism).
12 DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 194 (stating that McDougal rejects the Positivist
model in the international sphere).
13 Id. at 167-70 (discussing both Lasswell and McDougal's interest in collabora-
tion). It is unnecessary here to go through the details of the McDougal-Lasswell
liaison in their creation of policy science. Note that Lasswell was a member of the
Chicago School of Sociology, but he was also the president of the American Politi-
cal Science Association and he taught and wrote on psychology. He did important
work in communications as well as political psychology.
2012]
128 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:2
gram sought to shape the law based on what today might be called
"data driven" policy choices."4
Realists, rejecting the idea that law was determinant, turned
to social sciences to fill in the blanks. Lasswell and McDougal thought
Realists had only a vague, undeveloped idea of what they were after,
and in any event, failed to adumbrate constructive guidance. 15 To
14 See id. at 169-70.
15 Id. at 171 (stating Realists looked to social science, but were unaware of what
they were looking for, and misunderstood social science as a complement to law).
In Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science, and Policy, Lasswell
and McDougal praise the realists for their insight that law is about authoritative
choices and for the fruitful use of anthropology, psychoanalysis, learning theory,
sociology, social psychology, economics, etc. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MC-
DOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POL-
ICY 14 (New Haven Press 1992) [hereinafter LASSWELL & McDouGAL]. Their
criticisms are largely that they were too local, too negative and that they did not
appropriately use science and law as tools to serve social/community values. Id. at
15-16. They did not carry the project further to create a comprehensive guiding
theory. They go on to state:"[t]he many important contributions of the American
legal realists cannot, thus, be said to be much more than preliminary to the affirm-
ative problems ofjurisprudence." Id. at 15. While applauding their assault on slot
machine conceptions of legal process, they state
there is a limit beyond which the laborious demonstration of
equivalencies in the language of the courts cannot go: eventually
the critic must offer constructive guidance as to what and how
courts and other decision makers should decide upon the whole
range of problems importantly affecting public order. Similarly,
some realists have done little service to 'science' and scarcely
more to 'law' by merely proclaiming the virtues of scientific
modes of thought and investigation.
Id. Lasswell and McDougal identified the challenge for legal scholars as creating
a jurisprudence that is "relevant to establishing and maintaining demanded public
order." Id. at 16. By this they mean a public order that secures "demanded values
in all their communities." Id. As Richard Falk notes,
[t]hey perceive American legal realism as an antecedent to their
work, admirable for its critical focus on the interplay between
rules and social process in the enunciation of law in authoritative
form, especially through the operations of appellate courts. In-
deed, the McDougal and Lasswell undertaking can be regarded
as converting the core insight of legal realism into a comprehen-
sive framework of inquiry, including the provision of a normative
rudder-the eight constituent values of a free society dedicated to
the promotion of human dignity-by which to assess the relative
merits of opposing lines of argument and analyses of factual
circumstances.
Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law,
104 YALE L.J. 1991, 1991-92 (1995) (reviewing HAROLD LASSWELL & MYRES MC-
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remedy this defect, McDougal and Lasswell created a superstructure
of social processes leading to the choice of policy outcomes they postu-
lated.16 Policy Science advocates deluged observers with the claimed
necessity for information gathering procedural processes before a legal
decision is made.17 As explained hereafter, this deluge was a major
reason for the virtual rejection of Policy Science on the domestic
United States level. 18
The first prerequisite of this superstructure is to adopt the "ob-
servational standpoint"" where the observer focuses on a community
of a concern.20 The observer looks at the process she wants to influ-
ence. 2' The observer needs to concentrate on the "actual techniques
for making a decision."2 The observer also needs to detach herself
from the sector being examined, 23 and exam her own emotion, paro-
chial tendencies, and distortions that result from intense training in a
given discipline such as law.24 We wish the "observers" a lot of luck
with this task in particular. Reisman argued that this detachment
may be necessary because problems may transcend boundaries of both
geography and a given discipline.25
Upon achieving an appropriate perspective, the observer ap-
plies the intellectual tasks of decision: goal clarification, past trend
analysis, factor analysis, predictions, and consideration of policy alter-
natives.2" Goal clarification means what it says: consideration and
DOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POL-
ICY (1992)).
16 See REISMAN ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 28-33.
17 REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 14-16, 516-17.
18 See infra note 46 and accompanying text (referring to some of the policy science
descriptions of the procedural processes as "ponderous and perhaps impenetra-
ble"). For example, it is very difficult to see how all these procedures would apply
to, say, a judge deciding a case. They make some sense if what you are doing is
drafting legislation or rules and regulations, or forming a national security policy,
or an environmental strategy, but can they guide adjudication? Can a judge be
expected to go through this process when deciding a case?
19 REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 12.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 12-13.
24 Id. at 13.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 16-20; see also LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 15, at 35 (stating that
where the performance of intellectual tasks are stated as, "clarification of goals,
the description of past trends in decision, the analysis of conditions affecting deci-
sion, the projection of future trends in decision, and the invention and evaluation
of policy alternatives."); id. at 35-38 (describing these tasks).
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choice of what policy you want to achieve.2 ' Looking to former trends
may include how decision-makers have handled the problem in the
past. Factor analysis goes beyond looking at past trends as a way of
predicting future trends and asks what factors may change and what
impact those multiple factors may have on the future.2" Consideration
of policy alternatives means evaluating alternative means for securing
the claimed policy objectives.29
The performance of these tasks and other tasks mentioned in
this paragraph will not be easy. First is the prediction or educated
guesses about what the future holds, suggesting the conditioning of
the decision 3 0 carries a perilous problem, namely the crystal ball prob-
lem. Secondly, while comprehensiveness of inquiry is desirable, it is to
be balanced by selectivity-time is not infinite.3 ' Perhaps this choice
holds a troublesome contradiction, a judge or other decision maker will
have difficulty finding the time to administer these tasks. Thirdly, the
observer needs a theory about law, a jurisprudence that is appropri-
ate. 32 Fourth, the observer should envision that, at times, people say
one thing and do another.3' At a higher level of abstraction, the juris-
prudential theory should take note of the authority and control dichot-
omy: authority is the identification of the expectation of who will make
decisions, and expectations of what will be done, while control is the
effectiveness of the decisions actually made, whether authorized or
not.3 4 This work's final focus is the public/private distinction.35
27 REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 16-20 (offering a comprehensive survey
supporting this paragraph).
28 See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 15, at 20, 37.
29 REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 17.
30 See id. at 17.
31 Id. at 13.
32 Id. There are plenty of these to choose from! See Van Doren, supra note 5, at
160-65 (enumerating nineteen or more jurisprudential theories in a playful
"Restatement").
33 See LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 15, at 18, 22-24 (clarifying that the
observational standpoint of the practitioner is different from that of the academic).
The former is often concerned with power, while the latter is more concerned with
enlightenment or knowledge. An appropriate jurisprudence from their perspec-
tive, would address both observational standpoints. For difficulties here, see supra
note 43.
34 See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 59, 202 (6th ed. 2008) (asserting
that authority is the expectation concerning the identity and competence of the
decision maker, and control is the effectiveness of a decision whether authorized or
not).
35 REISMAN ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that
some proscribed activities produce strong state sanctions for public wrongs and
others produce only individual sanctions for private transgressions).
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According to policy science, law professors should use the
teaching of these processes to train elite decision makers to clarify and
implement goals desired by persons.3" Policy science advocates postu-
late eight goals or objectives people want and need to sustain their
human dignity-namely power, respect, affection, well-being, skill,
rectitude, wealth, and enlightenment. 37 At least as applied to the in-
ternational arena, these eight goals are shorthand for a long list of
corollary values.3" This aspiration was to be achieved by shaping and
sharing the eight objects of human desire to promote the maximum
distribution of valued things, such as education, wealth, and so on,
consistent with individual effort expended.3 9 They argue that human
dignity is fostered by the fulfillment of the eight policy goals of the
McDougal-Lasswell system.40 According to the advocates of policy sci-
ence, properly understood and applied, these goals do not conflict and
36 See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 19; Duxbury, supra note 1 at 168-
169, 180-181, 185 (stating that potential elite decision makers at Yale strongly
resisted Policy Science)
37 See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 14-15. This goal-value framework
was highlighted in McDougal's property casebook. See MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL &
DAVID HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOP-
MENT 1 (1948) [hereinafter McDouGAL & HABER] (enumerating values). See gener-
ally LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 15, at 335-591, 399-452, 453-72, 473-507,
509-23, 525-38, 539-55, 557-73, 575-90 (covering in deeper specificity the individ-
ual topics of Power, Enlightenment, Wealth, Well-being, Skill, Affection, Respect,
and Rectitude).
38 See generally LASSWELL & McDouGAL, supra note 15, at 1423-36, 1439-88,
1548-64 & Appendix IV (providing exhaustive outlines of subcomponents of the
eight goal choices). Some of these subcomponents are not clear from the terms
they qualify. This saturation of aims and goals is laden with contradiction
potential.
39 See LUTHER L. McDOUGAL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND:
ALLOCATION, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT, at vi (2d ed. 1981) (finding the widest
sharing possible consistent with capabilities and actual contributions to society);
see also Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203, 290 (1943).
McDougal and Lasswell originally designed policy science for the domestic United
States legal context, as set out in their manifesto published in the Yale Law Jour-
nal in 1943. This "contributions to society" criterion is what the fight is about
these days, workers vs. capital investors, should the rich pay more tax, and so on.
40 Julien Cantegreil, Legal Formalism Meets Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence: A
More European Approach to Frame the War on Terror, 60 MAINE L. REV. 98,
122,125 (2008) (providing that human dignity is the goal of the New Haven School
of International Law using the eight goals or values); Myres S. McDougal, Human
Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying
General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387, 406 (1974) (maintaining that
universal public order of human dignity is the overriding goal).
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can solve concrete cases.4 1 McDougal and Lasswell taught that a ma-
jor function of legal education was to train elite decision makers to
perform the intellectual task of clarifying and implementing these
goals.4 2
II. GENERAL CRITIQUE OF POLICY SCIENCE
The McDougal-Lasswell system attracted a host of critique.
Some of that critique carries over to the international arena where pol-
icy science has a foothold. The major reason given for the failure of
domestic arena application of policy science, according to a leading
commentator, was skepticism over whether the welter of procedural
inquiries would actually produce a better substantive decision." Put
another way, the best analytical methods of information gathering
may not produce the best problem or case solution. 44 Suppose the deci-
41 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 188 (representing that those understanding the
system were promised to never be at a loss for certainty). See generally infra notes
32, 43, 47, & 54 and accompanying text for doubts about whether these goals solve
concrete cases.
42 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 185 (asserting that legal education should train
the elite decision makers in Policy Science); see also supra note 36; REISMAN ET AL.,
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 16. Reisman has a summary that is
helpful to understand what the properly informed decision- maker should do. The
shorthand of decision planning is fostering knowledge of participants, perspec-
tives, situations, bases, strategies and outcomes. Thus, the decision maker reflec-
tion includes: who is making the decisions ("participants" in McDougal-Lasswell
jargon), what are their perspectives, e.g., biases, where do they interact, what re-
sources are brought to bear, is coercion or persuasion being used, at what group is
the "pitch" being made, elite or broad audiences, and what outcomes are being
obtained.
43 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 202; see also id. at 184, 188 (stating that Policy
Science does not reveal criteria for deciding between conflicting values or value
tradeoffs). Policy scientists partially address this issue by distinguishing between
the different roles of academic and practitioner. The former is looking more for
enlightenment or knowledge while the later is looking to make effective decisions.
But ultimately both perspectives are riddled with subjectivity.
44 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Envi-
ronmental Law: A Process-Oriented Inquiry into Sustainable Development, 32
YALE J. INT'L L. 363, 377 (2007). This is reminiscent of the old problem for utilita-
rianism; if people always tried to do the utilitarian calculus to figure out what to
do, they would not likely be maximizing utility or happiness. Figuring out how to
maximize these values will not necessarily lead to maximizing them. One re-
sponse is to maximize utility through rule utilitarianism rather than act utilitari-
anism or rule of thumb utilitarianism or through the idea of tacking while sailing.
In other words, you do not get to the end that you desire by a straight line, but by
tacking back and forth with an eye to the end.
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sion maker has the time and resources to gather data and weigh the
factors-who knows if the decision will be better?45
Secondly, policy science would require major retooling of law
professorial skills and orientation. Law professors would need to reo-
rient from doctrinal analysis and the usual mix of lawyering skills to
social science and policy analysis. Policy science would also defeat stu-
dent expectations regarding their legal training. For many professors
and students alike, the terminology and jargon of Policy Science would
be difficult, ponderous, and perhaps impenetrable.46 Students have
enough difficulty mastering the legal language of judicial decisions,
but this would be compounded if they were also required to grapple
with Policy Science.
Thirdly, high-level abstractions-like human dignity, wealth
shaping and sharing consistent with effort, "wealth," and the other
seven goals-may not solve concrete cases." This is a weak link in the
chain. Policy choice does not rest on science or neutral assessment,
but rather on maximizing a certain set of values designed ultimately to
maximize dignity.4" Unlike utilitarians, who are content to leave the
ends/values open to whatever makes people happy or increases wel-
fare, Policy Science includes wellbeing and wealth along with six other
values that appear to overlap in some cases and compete in others.
The values do not form a coherent whole, like pieces of a single pie, but
45 A related problem is that some policy science advocates may not be fully ac-
quainted with the ebbs and flows of all the social sciences. The hybrid products of
policy science could be without sufficient training in either law or the social sci-
ences at least from the students' perspectives.
46 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 188, 202 (describing Policy Science texts as
dense, idiosyncratic, verbose, and conceptually outlandish, which made their pro-
posals seem ridiculous). Many of the terms, tasks and projections have explana-
tions that further complicate the outline presented above. Compare, for example,
law and economics, which, whatever its other faults, stresses one central value-
wealth maximization-and does not have the decision-related baggage of policy
science. See infra text accompanying note 103.
47 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 184, 188 (arguing that policy science does not
reveal criteria for deciding between value conflicts or tradeoffs). Reisman is an
acolyte and not a critic, but he still raises the question of conflict of goals. See
REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 590 (questioning whether policy goals may
clash and not be subject to quantification). The decision maker who focuses on
"human dignity" will inject a subjective value factor into a supposedly objective
process. See SHAW, supra note 34, at 61.
48 In this respect, critics saw policy science suffering from the same problems as
Natural Law. Cf. REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 590 (questioning if Policy
Science is subject to the same criticism as Natural Law regarding the lack of em-
pirical proof for the values asserted). The Natural Law label, which held sway for
so long in jurisprudential history, is tantamount to an albatross today. Law
professors and students alike could be expected to balk at this project.
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are a grab bag of values correlating to the overlapping fields of social
scientific disciplines.4 9
Other detractors noted that policy science stressed a Western
ideology that the post-Cold War United States' foreign policy used for
propaganda and ideological military aggression.5 ° Critics found this
extremely problematic in view of failures in Vietnam, the United
States' response to 9/11, and the unilateral war of aggression in Iraq. 1
Key adherents, such as Oscar Schachter of Columbia and Richard Falk
of Princeton, broke off from the school during the Vietnam War.5 2
Harold Koh notes adherents believed McDougal and others applied,
"their theory in a highly selective manner to override the constraints
of law in favor of the 'higher ends' sought by present U.S. policy."5 3 As
Richard Falk put it:
Indeed, in other writing and speaking-especially that of
McDougal-devoted to discussion of controversial policy
issues (how to interpret the U.N. Charter in light of So-
viet obstructionism; how to appraise the legality of hy-
drogen bomb tests in the Pacific; how to evaluate
contested Cold War interventions in Vietnam or Nicara-
gua), the results, although elaborated in alleged relation
to the jurisprudential frame, had an uncomfortable ten-
dency to coincide with the outlook of the U.S. govern-
ment and to seem more polemically driven than
scientifically demonstrated.5 4
The New Haven School of International Law presupposes an
ability to engage in dialogue and communication between global inter-
national law participants. But actors in international relations have
many parochial views that hinder dialogue and communication.5 6
Further, the "normative friction" is not as bipolar as it was during the
49 See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 15, at 377-79 (discussing well-being
outcomes from a Policy Science perspective).
50 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 197-98.
51 See Gary Minda, Narratives of International Law and Literature after 9/11, 11
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 435, 436-42 (2005).
52 Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a "New"New Haven School of International Law?,
32 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 563 (2007).
53 Id. (quoting remarks by Oscar Schachter, Symposium, McDougal's Jurispru-
dence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, Address Before the Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law
Annual Meeting (Apr. 26, 1985) in 79 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 266, 272-73 (1985)).
54 Falk, supra note 15, at 2001.
55 See Christopher Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and
Normative Friction, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 362 (2007) (sharing values and cross-
cultural exchange is antithetical to the world view of major international
participants).56 See id.
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Cold War.57 The friction is multifaceted and has expanded post 9/11
with the Afghan and Iraqi wars.5 ' The New Haven School has not
adjusted their program to adequately consider how meaningful dia-
logue can occur under the existing situation of competitive world views
that seemingly have little common ground or shared assumptions.5 9
While many of these criticisms are directed to, or carry over
into, the international law arena, the next section attempts to distin-
guish the domestic area. The following discussion suggests why Policy
Science is virtually dead domestically, but has been transfigured to
make its proponents active players in the international law area.
A. Policy Science Extended to International Law
First, we review the turn of Policy Science to international law.
During the 1943 manifesto, McDougal was a teacher and a prominent
player in the property arena.60 During World War II, McDougal trav-
elled to Washington D.C., where this work exposed him to interna-
tional law. 61 His interest triggered, McDougal returned to Yale and
taught international law, extending his policy science jurisprudence to
that arena.6 2
Influenced by World War II, McDougal began seeing interna-
tional relations as a basic tension between democratic and autocratic
regimes. McDougal thought this conflict should be brought into light
to effectuate democratic values. He thought Legal Positivism should
be abandoned, because at best, it masked this fundamental conflict.6 3
Positivism did not provide good tools for critiquing autocratic or totali-
tarian regimes like Nazi Germany or Soviet Stalinism.6 4 If, in the pos-
57 See id.
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 See McDoUGAL & HABER, supra note 37; Myres S. McDougal, Future Interests
Restated: Tradition versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1077, 1077
(1942) (criticizing the Restatement of Property); see also supra note 39 (providing
for the manifesto).
61 See DuxBURy, supra note 1, at 192-93 (describing McDougal's move to Washing-
ton DC and his appointment as General Counsel to the Relief and Rehabilitation
Agency).
62 See id. at 194-96 (explaining how McDougal and Lasswell transform their own
post-realism jurisprudence to international law). See generally supra note 1 and
accompanying text (giving historical background information on Policy Science).
63 DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 193-94 (referencing the Policy Science creator Mc-
Dougal's rejection of Legal Positivism in international law).
64 See the famous debates between H.L.A. Hart and L. Lon Fuller over "Nazi law"
and the need for the severability of law and morals. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 593-629 (1958); Lon L.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
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itivist view, laws are rules or commands that are backed by the force of
the state (i.e. rules that are regularly enforced), then there is little to
distinguish the "laws" of Nazi Germany from U.S. law. For McDougal,
the Legal Positivists in international law he knew at Oxford had little
to offer. 5 They often failed to appreciate that rules and principles
travel in pairs of opposites, such as pacta sunt servanda (treaties must
be respected) and rebus sic stantibus (changed conditions may warrant
revision)." McDougal argued that either principle could be chosen to
achieve a result the decision-maker favors.67 Thus, law is far from be-
ing a set of neutral rules but rather is a matter of choice.
McDougal then retained certain approaches from domestic pol-
icy science. He thought Positivism led to confusion and masked policy
choices that instead should be created and articulated.6" Conflicts in
international law's rules and principles could be rendered unimpor-
tant by resolutions with articulated policy choices. Thus, McDougal
and Lasswell borrowed the frames they adumbrated in the formula-
tion of domestic policy science and applied them to international law.6 9
III. PRESENT STATUS OF POLICY SCIENCE
A. Domestic United States Law: Death of Policy Science
The McDougal-Lasswell Policy Science model is virtually dead
in the United States domestic law arena.7 ° No doubt this demise is
REV. 630, 630-672 (1958); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 198-207
(1961); L. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 95-151 (1964); H.L.A Hart, Book
Review: The Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965) (reviewing L. LON
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)) (continuing the debate).
65 DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 193.
66 Id. at 194.
67 Id. at 195.
68 Id. at 200.
69 See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 39, at 219-32.
70 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. But see DuxBuRY, supra note 1, at 5
(asserting that American jurisprudence should not be seen as movements dying
and being replaced). A survey of contemporary textbooks, general treatises, and
study aids on jurisprudence turns up very few references to Policy Science. Policy
Science did not make it into DAVID KENNEDY & WILLIAM W. FISH4ER, THE CANNON
OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (2006), where the authors claim that the work con-
tains "the twenty most important works of American legal Thought" in preface.
Brian Leiter argues that "scholars at Yale (notably Harold Lasswell and Myers
McDougal) propounded a watered-down version of Realism under the slogan 'pol-
icy science[,]"' and he continues that "'[plolicy science' is now, happily, defunct,
since it had far more to do with rationalizing American imperialism than it did
with science." Brian Leiter, Legacy of Legal Realism II: Legal Theory, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 61 (Martin
P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). Brian Bix's article in THE OX-
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due in significant part to the criticisms previously enumerated.7 1 It is
true that McDougal, Lasswell and their successor, Professor Michael
Reisman, have engaged in training many law professors and jurists,
foreign and domestic. These scholars and jurists could be carrying on
the tradition in law schools and other forums, but no articles have
been written on policy science in mainstream domestic law reviews in
the last decade.72
FORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES contains a very short treatment of Policy Sci-
ence, where he argues that "[B]oth [Policy Science and the process school] faltered
because they assumed a neutrality in the social sciences and an ability of the so-
cial sciences to answer substantive questions of governance, assumptions that
turned out to be untenable." Brian Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 975, 981 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet,
2003). M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 262, 856-57,
1001, 1032, 1034 (8th ed. 2008) does not have a section on Policy Science, although
the works of McDougal and Lasswell are discussed briefly in a few places. The
following jurisprudence textbooks and general treatises make no mention of Policy
Science, Lasswell, McDougal, Reisman, or the New Haven School: BRIAN BIX, Ju-
RISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (5th ed. 2009); GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PAT-
RICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
LAW (3d ed. 2008); PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds.,
7th ed. 2004); MARK TEBBIT, PHILOSOSPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2000).
Nonetheless, Anthony Kronman, in THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION (1993), argues that even though "the specialized terminology they
invented has for the most part been forgotten," those who conclude their recom-
mended approach is obsolete are mistaken. Id. at 201. Rather he argues "though
the details of their approach and their idiosyncratic vocabulary have indeed disap-
peared from the mainstream of American legal theory, the general position that
Lasswell and McDougal defend describes the unspoken common ground on which
both the law-and-economics and the critical legal studies movements rest." Id. at
201-02. Kronman, in fact, sees the "law and.. ." movement as being the latest
heirs of Policy Science. Id. at 355, 356. One could just as easily and accurately say
that American Legal Realism actually forms that common base for policy science,
CLS, law and economics and the "law and . . ." movement. While Kronman does
not think the heirs of Policy Science can provide the cure for the lost lawyer, he
does set them up as the main rival to the view of the lawyer as statesman that he
supports. Id. at 353-81. Kronman's book was written one year after Jurisprudence
for a Free Society. It is somewhat odd and sad that most of those influenced by
Policy Science had moved on before Lasswell and McDougal's opus was published.
71 See supra Section II.
72 But see Policy Science at Yale website and their in-house Law Journal. The
journal Policy Sciences is a publication of the Society for Policy Science. A review
of the articles published in the journal since 2000 reveals that out of over 200
published articles only around 50 of those articles are clearly law related. There
are only a handful of those articles that are written on first year law curriculum
subjects (with a few more written on property topics than on other first year course
topics) and with the bulk of articles being written in the areas of environmental
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It is suggested that the following critiques are important to the
domestic failure of policy science, but are relatively insignificant in in-
ternational affairs. Decision makers in the international area, such as
high ranking government officials, who are clearly involved in creating
law through treaties and the United Nations, sometimes have more
time and resources to devote to the procedural processes outlined by
policy science.
Some reasons for the domestic rejection are relatively inappli-
cable to the international arena. A major reason for domestic rejection
is that asking United States law professors to retool into the cumber-
some policy science terminology has been, and will be, met with resis-
tance.13  Moreover, law students have and would offer strong
resistance. Students at the majority of "non-elite" law schools through-
out the country are apt to complain when any course veers too far
afield of bar and practice relevant materials."4 There also has been a
push since the MacCrate Report in 1992 to infuse more practical skills
into our courses.7 5 Thus, someone who wishes to teach a course from a
policy or theoretical perspective is going to run into resistance from
students who want to see a "payoff." The same would not be true of
students who volunteer to take an elective in international law, juris-
prudence, or even environmental law. This is true, not only because
law, international environmental law and other international law subjects. POL'Y
ScI. CENTER, http://www.policysciences.org/pubs.cfm (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
73 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 190-91 (arguing that policy science is too idiosyn-
cratic, elitist, and costly, which caused a strong resistance). Students may be resis-
tant because in order to fully buy into the approach one would have to be
comfortable with the methodology and values-one would probably want to have a
PhD or to have completed advanced studies in sociology, social science methodol-
ogy, philosophy and law. Once one has expended time and resources on these dis-
ciplines, one would probably chart her own path or follow in the path of any of a
number of other interesting schools of thought. If one is trying to foist it on law
students, there will not be enough time to justify the approach or its policy
objectives.
74 The ABA standards support this view. "A law school shall maintain an educa-
tional program that prepares its students for admission to the bar, and effective
and responsible participation in the legal profession." ABA STANDARDS AND RULES
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH. § 301(a) (2011-2012), http://www.
americanbar. org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal-education/Standards/
2011_2012_standards-and-rules-for web.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS].
75 See Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Contin-
uum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/legal education/publications/maccrate.html [hereinafter
THE MACCRATE REPORT]; WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREP-
ARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 8 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; see
also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 74.
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the courses would be few, but also because these courses are not tested
on the bar, and practice in some of these areas is seen as involving
more general advocacy and less litigation. Environmental law in-
cludes many norms that are not legally binding, but are explicitly po-
litical or policy based guidelines or standards (referred to as soft
law).7 6
Moreover, trashing Legal Positivism in favor of a policy analy-
sis would create a firestorm. Teaching of law today occurs in law
schools where the aura is one of Legal Positivism. Law students would
have a short fuse for extensive policy analysis-if any law professors
were capable of it. The atmosphere in the law schools when McDougal
and Lasswell taught also was not conducive to policy analysis.77 Al-
most all of our law professors taught as though they were legal posi-
tivists. When we have attended the classes of our colleagues in
various law schools, domestic and foreign, with few exceptions, the
tenor of the presentation is positivist. Policy Science at Yale, accord-
ing to McDougal himself, was subject to the pejorative student epithet,"cave of the winds."" Nothing has changed in this regard. The aura of
the law schools remains one of Legal Positivism. 79
One explanation for the different reception on the domestic
front than on the international front is a difference in baselines in the
two arenas, with a general presumption of positive law in the domestic
arena8 0 and a presumption of power politics and lawlessness in the
76 For instance, the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development states
in the preamble that it is "[w]orking towards international agreements which re-
spect the interests of all and protects the integrity of the global environmental and
developmental system." United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. AICoNF.151126JRev.1 (Vol. 1), pmbl., available at http://
www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&article
id=1163.
77 Yale was a hostile environment. Imagine third or fourth tier schools where stu-
dents are trying to pass the bar and get a garden variety job as a lawyer (as op-
posed to a job in the State Department).
78 See supra note 4.
79 But see John Norton Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres Mc-
Dougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REV. 662 (1968) (summarizing the McDou-
gal-Lasswell meta-language, hoping to cure what he sees as the Legal Realist (not
Legal Positivist) legacy of malaise in law schools).
80 If you think about it, no one questions if domestic law is law. The presumption
is there is at least some "there" there. It may be that it is indeterminate, that rules
do not self-interpret, and that politics, psychology, social forces, etc. all impact
decisions. Few, however, think that the body of stuff we call law (the statutes and
prior cases, etc.) do not work at all. It may be that a good lawyer only relies on
"doctrine" as a starting point for discussion. Nonetheless, being able to marshal
doctrinal legal sources is a necessary starting point for practice.
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international arena. It is almost as if the latter is still in Hobbes's
state of nature with no sovereign and no "rule of law." Meanwhile, in
U.S. domestic law, the presumption (however deluded) is that we gen-
erally live under the rule of law with a system of laws.
Thus, one major reason for the success of the New Haven
School, as opposed to domestic Policy Science, is that the political real-
ist critique of international law, and thereby the realist approach to
international law, has been more durable than the American legal re-
alist critique of domestic law. In a sense political realism with regard
to international law has been something of a baseline. People (at least
in the U.S.) tend to start with the idea that international law is largely
political and in fact largely about power politics. International realists
tend to be more reductionist than the domestic American legal real-
ists, in that they reduce law to mere power politics; American legal
realists were open to a whole host of factors that could go into law
creation, application, and adjudication.81
There is almost a presumption of lawlessness that needs to be
rebutted when it comes to international law. In part, this is because in
the positivist view of international law, law is created through the con-
sent of states, through treaties and customs. These are not always
clearly enforceable, leaving large gaps in the international law land-
scape. In this view, international law is like extreme laissez-faire con-
tracts.8 2 If extreme laissez-faire contracts dominated our domestic
law, then power would sit more clearly on the surface like it does in
treaty negotiations.8 3
Is there a domestic analogue to this? Perhaps there is in con-
tracts,8 4 with choice of law provisions, boiler plate provisions, and ar-
81 As Lasswell and McDougal note, "In their more constructive efforts the Ameri-
can realists have seized with great gusto upon anthropology, psychoanalysis,
learning theory, sociology, social psychology, economics and related disciplines and
exploited the findings in these several fields in their particular studies; they have
flung the doors wide to any reporter of new discoveries in the expanding science of
man." See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 15, at 14.
82 Note that under public international law, the general rule is no tribunal has
jurisdiction over a dispute unless the parties consent. See generally United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
83 For instance, look at the United States' history regarding the International
Criminal Court, of negotiating, signing, repudiating and entering into side treaties
to undermine the Court, and then allowing Security Council cases to be referred
there. See Kurt R. Willems, U.S. National Security and the International Criminal
Court: Should the Obama Administration Consider Reengagement?, 16 U.C. DAVIS
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 213, 222-25 (2009).
84 Even classical contract doctrine was arguably not as laissez-faire as contempo-
rary international law. Even under classic contract doctrine contracts could be
void for violating public policy, and consideration needed to be legal consideration.
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bitration clauses. Big companies, like powerful countries, get to
dictate most of this to the rest of us. Nonetheless, the focus in domes-
tic law doctrinal courses, including in contracts, is not so much on the
politics, processes, and policies of law, or norm creation, but on adjudi-
cation. Adjudication is often considered less political than other forms
of law creation and other forms of conflict resolution.
Although the typical U.S. textbook on international law is
overly focused on adjudicated cases, this emphasis is limited in two
very important respects that are somewhat unique to international
law. First, it is generally acknowledged from the beginning that
peaceful means of resolving disputes through adjudication is merely
one mechanism among many others for dispute resolution (which in-
clude self help countermeasures, the use of force, negotiation, concilia-
More importantly, there were clearly binding mechanisms for resolving contract
disputes. Modern contract law is not nearly as laissez-faire as either. Note, how-
ever, that the laissez-faire rule articulated in the Lotus Case (France v. Turkey,
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7)) (that States are free to do what they wish in
the absence of consenting to do otherwise) has been undermined with the growth
of non-consensual sources of international law. The development of jus cogens
norms (norms from which no derogation is allowed) and the development of gen-
eral principles of law recognized by so called "civilized nations" more and more
come in to fill in gaps or lacuna in the law. An interesting example of this can be
found in the Furund~ija case before the International Criminal Tribunal for For-
mer Yugoslavia. Prosector v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 183,
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf (addressing the issue as to whether
forced oral penetration could be charged as rape). Neither treaty law nor custom-
ary international law was specific enough to answer the question. Thus the courts
surveyed the laws of various countries to see if there was a general principle found
in the practices of the states surveyed that could answer the question. Id. at 180.
Here again, countries appeared to have been divided in how to categorize such a
case, with some counting it as sexual assault but not rape. Id. at 182. Nonethe-
less, the trial chamber went on to find that given that such an act was an outrage
against human dignity (dignity being "the very raison d'etre of international hu-
manitarian law and human rights law") it would not be inappropriate to include
forced oral penetration in the definition of rape. Id. at 183. As a result, it con-
cluded that the objective elements of rape included:
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or
any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.
Id. at 185.
It is an understatement to say that this would not count as a legal decision under a
positivist consent approach to international law.
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tion, mediation, etc.), and it is rarely the preferred mechanism. 5
Adjudication is, in fact, relatively rare in the arena of public interna-
tional law; the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") typically decides
a few cases a year.8 6 Secondly, judicial decisions are not considered a
binding source of law in international law. In other words, interna-
tional law does not have a doctrine of stare decisis or binding prece-
dent. 7 Although the decisions of the ICJ are binding on the parties
before the court,8 8 the court is also limited in its ability to enforce com-
pliance with its decisions. s 9
85 Note most domestic legal disputes are addressed through mechanisms other
than adjudication (even in the litigious U.S.). See THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CASELOAD INDICATORS 2010 (2010), http://www.us-
courts.gov/Statistics.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
86 The ICJ, since its inception in 1947, has had 124 contentious cases and 26 Advi-
sory Proceedings. See Cases: List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date
of Introduction, INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE http://www3.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?
pl=3&p2=2 (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
87 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-22 (7th
ed. 2008).
88 Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice reads, "The deci-
sion of the Court has no binding force except as between the parties and in respect
of that particular case." United Nations, Statute of International Court of Justice
art. 59 (June 26, 1945).
89 The U.N. Charter art. 94(1) imposes an obligation on U.N. Member-States to
undertake to comply with decisions of the International Court of Justice and art.
94(2) authorizes recourse to the U.N. Security Council in the event of non-compli-
ance. U.N. Charter art. 94. The U.S. Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas held that
because article 94 provides an exclusively political remedy, I.C.J. decisions were
not directly binding on U.S. Courts. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509, 511-12
(2008). Unfortunately, the Security Council has never enforced a decision of the
Court under its Article 94(2) powers. See CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 39 (2004). Both jurists and
jurisdictions are conflicted over the extent to which I.C.J. decisions are directly
binding on public officials within states that were parties before the Court. See
also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
1920-1996 249-52 (1997); c.f A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and Ameri-
can Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 883 (2000) (arguing that Article 94 of the
U.N. Charter does not impose obligations on the U.S. judiciary to comply with ICJ
judgments). See generally Jesse Townsend, Note, Medellin Stands Alone: Common
Law Nations Do Not Show a Shared Postratification Understanding of the I.C.J.,
34 YALE J. INT'L L. 463, 463-65 (2009) (arguing that contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Medellin, other nations do consider I.C.J. decisions as being
binding on public officials). In spite of these shortcomings, at least one commenta-
tor has argued that "...almost all of the Court's decisions have achieved substan-
tial, albeit imperfect, compliance." See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and
Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 815 (2007).
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This fits nicely with the New Haven emphasis on the entire
process of authoritative decision-making. The fact that international
realism forms the baseline for discussions about international law,
rather than positivism, makes it is easier for the New Haven School to
appear relevant in this domain. The New Haven School, which could
be viewed as a continuation of the domestic Legal Realist project, can
continue to have a fruitful antagonist/protagonist relationship with re-
alism in international law in a way that it really cannot on the domes-
tic sphere, where positivism dominates. In the domestic arena legal
realists had already successfully argued that law was more than mere
power politics.9 ° By the time Lasswell and McDougal's published their
opus in 1992, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, they were out of touch
with domestic developments in jurisprudence. 9 ' Nonetheless, Richard
Falk, an international law theorist who is otherwise critical of the New
Haven School, did not find it all that problematic that Lasswell and
McDougal failed to address virtually any literature from the twenty-
five years preceding the publication of Jurisprudence for a Free Soci-
ety.9 2 Thus, when the New Haven international jurists say it is not
just about power politics, but also about authority, dignity, and maxi-
90 See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text. Realists are very diverse in
their views, but they drew on the whole range of social sciences in their quests to
empirically test the law in action, be it psychology, anthropology, economics, soci-
ology, history or politics. See Shannon Hoctor, Legal Realism, in JURISPRUDENCE
158, 163 (Christopher J. Roederer & Darrel Moellendorf eds., 2004).
91 In Chapter 1: Criteria for a Theory About Law, Lasswell and McDougal can-
vass natural law (pp 6-7), historical jurisprudence (pp 7-8), positivism (pp 8-11),
sociological jurisprudence, including Marxist jurisprudence (pp 11-13) and then
they end by addressing what they call a "relatively recent frame of reference
known as 'American Legal Realism' (pp 13-16). In other words, they never really
engage developments in legal theory from the 1950s onwards, including the Pro-
cess School, Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race, Feminism, Law and Economics,
etc., all of which were flourishing in the '80s and '90s. They do address what they
call "contemporary perspectives" on pages 257-66 where they run through much of
this list, which they critique as fragmented frames (Incrementalism, Process, Law
and Economics, Critical Legal Studies) and where they give a nod to recent trends
in the use of social science for helping make rational authoritative decisions. Even
in this section, most of the works cited are from the '70s and early '80s. LASSWELL
& McDOUGAL, supra note 15, at 3-16, 257-67.
92 See Falk, supra note 15, at 1993-94. After noting that the authors' had failed "to
refer in the text or footnotes to the major scholarly work or historical develop-
ments of the last twenty-five years" he continues to state that "[ulpdating would
have added, at most, little more than an aura of contemporaneity." He does later
note that, "[there is in this vast work no discussion of feminist, gay and lesbian,
indigenous peoples', or black's 'readings' of international law. This is a serious
omission given the powerful critiques of hegemonic discourses of various sorts that
emerged in the 1980's and 1990's." Id. at 1999.
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mizing all other ends or values, it fits within and expands upon the
language of the dominant paradigm.
The New Haven Policy Science idea that J...law is most realis-
tically observed, not as a mere rigid set of rules but as the whole pro-
cess of authoritative decision in which patterns of authority and
patterns of control are appropriately conjoined,"9 can be addressed
more fully in an international law course than in a first year doctrinal
course. For various reasons, it is easier to look at the whole process of
decision-making when talking about various treaty regimes, or the de-
velopment of various international regimes like human rights, human-
itarian law, the law of the sea, international criminal law, and the like,
than it is when looking at torts, contracts, criminal law, and other
foundational law topics. In part because of time, we generally do not
address the legislative history of a statute or the filing of a case that
was eventually adjudicated. The process is too complicated and messy.
It is easier to make a few occasional observations about how some of
these processes work and then focus on the products of those processes
(the statutes and cases, etc.). Simply, there is not enough time to cover
the doctrine sufficiently while doing the research mentioned, even if
that is the seat of the action.
It is also true, however, that McDougal and his associates at
Yale Law School inspired numerous acolytes in his LL.M. program.
These LL.M. graduates often became law professors and teachers of
domestic law subjects as well as international law. McDougal often
personally placed these graduate students in teaching jobs at law
schools throughout the country.9 4 A group of such acolytes gather pe-
riodically. But this influence has not been enough to sustain the do-
mestic policy science.
True, the occasional article cites McDougal-Lasswell Policy Sci-
ence and indicates it is using or advocates the use of a policy analysis
in the domestic arena.95 In law school, Professor Van Doren's profes-
93 Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a
Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 YALE STUD.WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 30 (1974).
94 As Richard Falk notes, "McDougal and Lasswell's jurisprudential publication -
produced over a period of decades - was paralleled by a pedagogical process that
sent forth influential students from the Yale Law School to all corners of the coun-
try and the world forever imprinted with the law, science, and policy ap-
proach. Indeed, the McDougal and Lasswell framework has had more influence in
Third World countries than any other American jurisprudential perspective - a
surprising result given the founders' penchant for applying their theory in justifi-
cation of U.S. foreign policy." Falk, supra note 15, at 1997.
95 See John Warren Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effec-
tively: Incentives for Perpetual Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219, 222 (2003)
(stating the writer is using McDougal-Lasswell Policy Science, but without provid-
ing any convincing detail of how); John Warren Kindt & Stephen W. Joy, Internet
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sor used the McDougal Haber casebook for Property.9 6 The fact that
there are only a few casebooks in the policy science mode on domestic
law indicates that policy science is dead for the purpose of studying the
domestic law of the United States. A property casebook written by
Professor Luther McDougal, in conjunction with Professor Myres Mc-
Dougal, constituted a valiant effort to infuse life into the McDougal-
Lasswell system, but that casebook has gone out of print.9 7
Another reason for the rejection of policy science on the domes-
tic level in the United States is that elite legalists cannot admit that it
is a myth that the law is a set of rules, and support the notion that
policy determines, and should determine, outcomes. After all, "policy"
is a polite word for politics.9" Powerful elites fear that they will lose
prestige, power, and what goes with it, if law is thought to be mere
policy, or even worse, politics. Whatever these elites may think in
their heart, they cannot admit publicly their status is partly based on
a myth. The typical or atypical judge will deny strenuously she or he
is guided by policy choices.
Gambling and the Destabilization of National and International Economies: Time
for A Comprehensive Ban on Gambling Over the World Wide Web, 80 DENV. U. L.
REV. 111, 112 n.5 (2002) (making several references to Lasswell and McDougal,
but makes little attempt to relate authors' conclusions to methodology or substan-
tive goals of Policy Science); Moore, supra note 79, at 662-63 (arguing that the law
schools are permeated with legal realist malaise and have taken only an ill-de-
fined policy approach and includes a very helpful introduction to Policy Science
terminology).
96 See generally McDOUGAL & HABER, supra note 37.
97 Professor Luther L. McDougal teamed up with Professor Myres McDougal to
produce a second edition, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1981). There are no further editions of this book. Professor
Van Doren used this book in Property I, which the students used to refer to as the
"red book." The cover was red in color, but the students were making an ideologi-
cal point. At least the book was not referred to as "pink." Within Constitutional
Law, the book that comes closest to adopting some of the insights of Policy Science
would be PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2006), which was first written by Paul Brest in
1975 in reaction to the subject by subject and Supreme Court decision focused
approach to Constitutional Law that prevailed at the time of the first edition and
continues to prevail to this day. Preface at xxxi. Rather, their approach addresses
the process of constitutional decision making by multiple actors within historical
periods up to the modern era (post 1937) and then address the materials topically
and functionally. Id. at xxxii. Although inspired by the process school, the authors
of this book may be postmodernists who are "skeptic[all about the legitimating
power of process divorced from larger substantive political values." Id. at xxxvi.
98 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 4 (asking why policy science conflating law and
politics should be troublesome and that McDougal and Lasswell approved the po-
litical nature if their politics was utilized).
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Further, if the law is not to be found in the traditional places
that lawyers have been trained to look for it, but rather in policy
choices that could be better made by trained social scientists and phi-
losophers,9 9 then is not the entire profession a myth or sham? In this
view, lawyers and judges who are untrained in Policy Science are not
professionals, but complete amateurs as to what really matters;
namely making choices that are informed by Policy Science. One who
is trained in a course or two on policy science surely could not count
himself as a professional in the area. The methods of Policy Science
cannot be mastered in a course or two. McDougal himself appeared to
need a lifelong academic companion and co-author from the social sci-
ences to develop the approach. Those who work in this area often have
Ph.D.'s in the social sciences. ° ° If, in this view, the social scientists
are the real experts (and this may be the case), then there is little
incentive for the academic, judge, law student, or practitioner to buy in
(unless they already have a Ph.D.). Even if one has a Ph.D., the social
sciences, in contrast to the natural sciences, tend to reward innovation
99 When addressing the values in the value-institution process, Lasswell and Mc-
Dougal list the types of specialist scholars who would be concerned with the study
of these values and processes. See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 15, at 377-
79. They include, in addition to jurists: political scientists; students of interna-
tional relations, communication and civic education; economists, medical profes-
sionals, social biologists, sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and
historians. Id. Note that philosophers are not included even though this set of
values and the ultimate end of dignity are as contested and indeterminate as the
legal rules and natural law principles that policy scientists wish to eschew.
100 There has been a strong trend of law faculties hiring Ph.D.'s. Brent E. Newton
documents the increase in Ph.D.s over the last 30 years in Preaching What They
Don't Practice: Why Law Faculties' Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship
and Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy,
62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 130-31 (2010) [hereinafter Newton, Legal Academy] ("In the
late 1980s, 5% of full-time law professors had Ph.D.'s in areas other than law."
(citing Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profes-
sion: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
191, 213 (1991)); ("By the end of the twentieth century, 10.4% of new tenure-track
hires had Ph.D.'s (13.2% at schools ranked in the top twenty-five)") (citing Richard
E. Redding, "Where Did You Go to Law School?" Gatekeeping for the Professoriate
and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 600 tbl.1 (2003)).
"Just a decade later, by 2010, that percentage had grown significantly, particu-
larly at the highly ranked schools. My own study of a representative sample of
entry-level, tenure-track professors hired between 2000 and 2009 (excluding clini-
cians, LRW professors, and other "practical" faculty) revealed that 18.9% pos-
sessed Ph.D.'s in addition to or in lieu of a law degree. Professors with Ph.D.'s
constituted 35.5% of such tenure-track faculty members hired since 2000 by the
first ten schools in tier one of the USNWR rankings." Id.
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and charting new research paths over working within and through ex-
isting paradigms like Policy Science. 1° '
In The Lost Lawyer, Anthony Kronman argues that "the gen-
eral proposition Lasswell and McDougal defend describes the unspo-
ken common ground upon which both the law-and-economics and the
critical legal studies movements rest."1" 2 It is true that law-and-eco-
nomics has achieved a high degree of acceptance on the United States
domestic legal front. Law-and-economic advocates argue that wealth
maximization is the central policy value and if it is not, it should be. 103
Interestingly, Reisman argues that this emphasis, though part of the
eight policy science goals, is not acceptable because the achievement of
many other goals is necessary to maximize human dignity.' 4 Law
and economics advocates do not relegate legal rules and principles to
limbo, as do policy science advocates.
When searching for signs of life of Policy Science in domestic
law, we came across a promising book by Paul Brest, former Dean of
Stanford, and Linda Hamilton Krieger, Former Professor of Law at
Boalt Hall. The book, Problem Solving, Decision Making, and Profes-
sional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers and Policy Makers, 10 5 is an in-
101 See generally PAUL A. ROTH, MEANING AND METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A
CASE FOR METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM (1987).
102 KRONMAN, supra note 70, at 202-03 (arguing common ground appears to be
that choice plays a determinative role in adjudication). Note, however, that
Kronman also states this was a reiteration of Jerome Frank's main point in at-
tacking Langdellian formalism (the view that law is a closed system of legal rules
and principles). Id.
103 Law-and-economics, as a general method, pales in comparison to policy science
in terms of its complexity. Its basic premises of rationality and wealth maximiza-
tion are relatively simple and straightforward and can be easily applied to a myr-
iad of social and legal problems. If its advocates could convince legislators, judges
and practitioners to follow its normative vision, then no doubt its descriptive and
predictive power would be quite strong. Fortunately, human beings tend to resist
being reduced to rational wealth maximizers and so this otherwise successful aca-
demic exercise will not likely be all that successful in practice as a single tool of
analysis, persuasion or decision. While Lasswell and McDougal employ what they
call the maximizing postulate, namely that "people will try to chose the course of
conduct that leaves them better off than the alternatives that they reject," they do
not reduce the whole range of values to merely wealth maximization, but to the
maximization of each value they list. LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 15, at
369.
104 See REISMAN & SHREIBER, supra note 1, at 560 (questioning law-and-economics
advocates' focus on wealth alone, ignoring enlightenment, well-being, power and
so on).
105 PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAK-
ING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS
(2010).
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terdisciplinary book designed for courses on decision making by
lawyers and policy makers. The back cover includes an endorsement
by the Dean of New York University, Richard L. Revesz, which would
have made Lasswell and McDougal envious. It states:
Their book is likely to transform the curricula of law
schools and public policy schools by providing an excel-
lent text for courses that systematically analyze the cru-
cially important, but hitherto largely neglected, process
by which lawyers and policymakers exercise their judg-
ment. Their multidisciplinary approach is ambitious and
rigorous yet clear and accessible.1 °6
Yet, not a single reference to Policy Science exists, McDougal or
Lasswell, in this textbook. Rather, as Paul Brest put it, "[o]ur project
is, for want of a better word, much more "technocratic" than Lasswell's
and McDougal's."1 ° 7 He further states:
[i]ts essential premise is that it's the counselor's job to
help a client maximize his or her utility, and its goal is
to teach students problem-solving skills through a mix-
ture of decision theory (light), social psychology and JDM
judgment and decision making], and behavioral econom-
ics. So, for better or worse, it is orthogonal to Lasswell
and McDougal and also to CLS and law & economics.1 0 8
B. Transfiguration: From Policy Science to the New Haven School
of International Law
McDougal-Lasswell Policy Science is alive and well in the in-
ternational law arena, where it is referred to as the New Haven School
of International Law, or the New Haven School." ° ' Although some
prominent commentators tout policy science in the international baili-
wick, it is still not the leading theory.
Many, if not most, international legalists dismiss policy sci-
ence.1 1 ° Thus, although the democratic values policy science seeks to
promote are desirable and important, an accepting world is not just
around the corner, and to posit otherwise makes international law
seem utopian and out of touch.1 11 Moreover, some international legal-
106 Id. at back cover (proving Revesz' endorsement).
107 Email from Paul Brest to Christopher Roederer (July 13, 2011) (on file with
author).108 Id.
109 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 199; Cantegreil, supra note 40, at 98; Koh,
supra note 52, at 562-63.
110 Borgen, supra note 55, at 331, 362.
111 See Borgen, supra note 55, at 359 (arguing that policy science historically re-
lated to U.S. foreign policy); Minda, supra note 51, at 436-37 (stating Vietnam War
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ists are partial to the positivist model, which is at odds with policy
analysis. 112
Policy science has undergone a transfiguration in its accept-
ance in the area of international law. The proponents of the New Ha-
ven School carry on McDougal's aversion to Legal Positivism to this
day. They refer to Legal Positivism as myth.1 13 New Haven advocates
stress policy and claim that even the decision to rely on positive law is
a policy decision, sometimes a decision to favor the status quo.'1 '
1. Some Reasons for Failure of the New Haven School to Achieve
Greater Acceptance
Perhaps some arguments against policy science applied to in-
ternational law have curtailed acceptance in the international law
arena. Policy science applied to international law has not escaped crit-
icism. Policy science has traditionally incorporated a formal attribute
of the observational perspective, and other uses of the word "science,"
which seems to import objectivity. 115 Recent commentators have criti-
cized this feature in the McDougal-Lasswell system. 16 One commen-
aftermath showed the projection of force of Western democratic values was a fail-
ure); see also DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 199 (arguing that many, if not most, inter-
national lawyers reject policy science because the world is not ready to be made
over in the liberal values posited).
112 See Cantegreil, supra note 40; see also SHAW, supra note 34, at 61 (asserting
that critics argue that policy science underrates the positivist legal content of in-
ternational law and the practice that most states abide by it).
113 See Cantegreil, supra note 40, at 122 (asserting that New Haven School schol-
ars may find European reliance on rules of international law as an unfortunate
reliance on a myth).
114 See generally Bratspies, supra note 44, at 377 (stressing the international
reach of environmental problems together with the importance of law as policy of
McDougal-Lasswell system and separating law from policy is an implicit policy to
favor the status quo).
115 See REismAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 577; Bratspies, supra note 44, at
377 (asserting that objective neutral decision making impossible for Policy sci-
ence); see also Falk, supra note 15, at 1999 (criticizing Policy Science).
116 See Van Doren, supra note 5, at 163-64; Falk, supra note 15, at 1999-2001
(arguing their enterprise fails "to help academic advisers and policymakers use
law as a specialized instrument in a wide variety of social and political arenas for
pursuing these normative goals." As he further argues, "[in my view, this part of
the enterprise fails, and is doomed to failure by its inherent nature. This failure is
expressed by the inability of honest, intelligent, morally sensitive, and politically
moderate individuals steeped in the New Haven approach to agree in the domain
of policy application. Reliance on the McDougal and Lasswell orientation tends, if
anything, to accentuate policy divergences as opposed viewpoints each claim 'sci-
entific' grounding for their position. As the Chinese proverb goes, '[tiwo persons in
the same bed have different dreams,'" further stating, "the effort to resolve policy
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tator found that the inherited policy science would not be able to offer
a perspective in any important court decision that would achieve an
objectively correct result."' Another commentator found that the ex-
istence of the faith in objective methodology in policy science was a
mistake."' Other commentators note a contradiction between the
hankering for objectivity and the admitted realities of the policy sci-
ence frame.11 9
The eight desired outcomes referred to previously are carried
over into the New Haven School's program. These goals or preferred
outcomes are predominantly Western democratic values and the con-
temporary policy scientist is to affirm those values. As in the domestic
sphere, however, those values may conflict. For example, even a sym-
pathetic critic of the New Haven School notes that the broad goals of
the International Community such as public order, liberty and human
dignity may conflict. In recent international law cases concerning
electronic surveillance, interception of telecommunications and storing
data, this conclusion is difficult to avoid.1 20 These cases have stressed"order" and downplayed human dignity.' 2 1
controversy by scientific inquiry has not succeeded. Opposing lines of interpreta-
tion by individuals of comparable intelligence and virtue can reach utterly opposed
policy conclusions on controversial matters even as they acknowledge their indebt-
edness to the McDougal and Lasswell jurisprudence.").
117 Bratspies, supra note 44, at 379.
118 See id.; see also DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 172-76 (quoting Professor Lawrence
Tribe, "the attempt to use an objectivist viewpoint will superimpose a distortion on
the process."). Somewhat contradictorily, McDougal and Lasswell distance them-
selves from the possibility of the scholar applying an objective approach to values.
Id. at 173-74. Indeed, for them such a separation would be impossible and even
undesirable. Id. at 173-75. Seemingly continuing the contradiction, while the
mechanics of the legal process must be observed dispassionately, the choices of
policy are "unashamedly" value laden. Id.
119 DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 175-76.
120 See Cantegreil, supra note 40, at 123-24 (citing conflicting standards in inter-
national law).
121 However, a recent commentator sympathetic to the New Haven School notes
positivism also can be used to transform international law. The commentator
opined that perhaps international lawyers, at least in the context of the War on
Terror, should consider an integration of the international law-oriented Legal Pos-
itivism and the New Haven School. See id. at 126-27. But it is unclear if the "inte-
gration" would be acceptable to either side. Juristic opinions do not ordinarily
articulate their policy goals. And the New Haven School advocates cannot disre-
gard the doctrine customarily used in international law. For example, it certainly
would be a good thing if the limits on the power of the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter were clearly defined. Id. at 125-26 (en-
couraging New Haven School scholars to find limitation on Security Council dis-
cretionary power and identify for courts reviewing such actions the appropriate
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2. Attempted Explanation of Paradox of "Death and
Transfiguration"
Our attempt to explain the rejection of Policy Science in the
domestic arena, and the acceptance in the international area is as fol-
lows. First, to transport policy science to the international law area, it
is not necessary to transform the basic teaching of law. The practically
oriented law students need not be assaulted with policy analysis and
the policy science jargon. The basic legal positivism of the United
States law schools, however defective and misleading, need not be
touched. International Law is often only one course.
Secondly, the United States domestic legal system is held to-
gether in part by this important Legal Positivist myth. The first
branch of the myth is that a Constitution drafted for an agricultural
society in the 18th century dictates the answers to important legal and
policy matters in the technological, industrial twenty-first century so-
ciety.1 2 2 The second branch of this myth is the claim of Legal Positiv-
ism-that there is really something called law out there to be true or
faithful to.' 2 3 So, juristic elites will deny the claim that in the domes-
tic arena, law is nothing but politics.' 2 4 Michael Reisman once wrote
"McDougal's image evolved from enfant terrible and destroyer of the
standard of review). The commentator further encourages new wave New Haven
School scholars to clarify the relation between complying with international
norms, unifying the international legal order, and diversifying values. Id. at 126.
Good luck on this one under any system. Thus, some commentators project a move
to "diversity values." Diverse values are fine so long as they do not collide in decid-
ing a particular case. The commentator above suggests that the European idea of
personal liberty equates with the United States goal of personal privacy. But
these concepts are producing different results in War on Terror cases. Id. at 123-
24.
122 See REsMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 306 (asserting that a constitution
drafted centuries before in different context is quite different from decisions of
current courts creating law); Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934) (doubting that a Constitution made for a small agricul-
tural society now informs a large industrial nation). For a current attempt to per-
petuate this myth, see the recent reading of the Constitution on the floor of the
House of Representatives, January 6, 2011. Lucy Madison, Constitution (As Ed-
ited) Read on House Floor, CBSNEws (Jan. 6, 2011, 01:12 PM), http://www.cb-
snews.com/8301-503544_162-20027598-503544.html (reporting that the reading
left out certain parts of the original Constitution such as slavery and was designed
to reflect the myth that the Constitution is operative intact).
123 See Van Doren, supra note 5, at 163-64 (citing Realists for the view that Re-
statements of the law assume a fact not in evidence. Namely, there is law out
there that is stated and thus capable of restatement).
124 See, e.g., Jack W. Van Doren, Exploring Contradictions, 4 FLA. B.J. Apr. 1985,
at 21, 23 (referencing Critical Legal Studies' belief that law is politics).
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law to elder statesman and prophet of human dignity."12 This evolu-
tion, we would argue, came with a shift in focus in his work from the
domestic sphere (where he was considered a destroyer of the law) to
the international sphere (where he was considered an elder statesman
and prophet of human dignity). This is in large part because of the
contrast between domestic faith in a positivist vision with skepticism
toward the existence of law in the international domain. 126 Though
some, perhaps many, recent commentators write as though there is
some "there" there, (some law in international law) others claim that
there is not any "there" there (no law in international law). 127
Indeed, the preeminent legal positivist of the mid-twentieth
century, Professor H.L.A. Hart found international law norms so
troublesome, that international law could not be admitted to the law
club. Hart, therefore, denies that what is called international law is,
in fact, law. No sovereign and no secondary rule of recognition ex-
ists.1 28 Jerome Frank, one of the fathers of American Legal Realism,
argued against having the National Lawyers Guild address controver-
sial issues of international law, because he considered such issues to
be matters of pure national interest, and not matters of law at all. 129
125 W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 108
YALE L.J. 935, 939 (1999).
126 On the international front McDougal and Lasswell were arguing legal rules
and authority mattered. See Oona A. Hathaway, The Continuing Influence of the
New Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 553, 556 (2007). They critiqued political
realism for overestimating the role of power and underestimating the importance
of rules and legal processes. See Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power
and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 157-60
(1953).
127 See DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 192 (citing Philip Marshall Brown, who stated
international law was derisively ignored and brazenly repudiated); Minda, supra
note 51, at 440 (referring to Gertrude Stein's famous quote). See generally Joshua
Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law is
Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451 (2010) (arguing for a skeptical view of the ability of
courts and other institutions to interpret the content of international law and
carry out its project in a manner that is consistent with minimal principles of
legality).
128 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994). The secondary rule
of recognition is a source deemed authoritative by officials in a system that con-
tains rules and principles by and large determinant of controversies. Id. at 94, 95.
It is doubtful that we really have a single secondary rule of recognition in domestic
law either. Id. at 214. Rather, we have various modes of argument that are more
or less acceptable to different legal actors.
129 The dispute, according to Dan Ernst in the Legal History Blog, was over
whether the National Lawyers Guild (to which Frank and Felix Cohen influential
Legal Realists, were members) should get involved in arguments regarding an em-
bargo against the belligerents in the Spanish Civil War. Felix Cohen, as chairman
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of the Guild's National Committee on International Law, wanted to publish a re-
port arguing that the embargo was invalid under existing law. Frank responded
by arguing
that the lifting of the arms embargo was 'basically, not a legal
question,' he protested to Cohen. 'The principles of international
law are peculiarly uncertain,' he elaborated. 'Historically, and by
their very nature, they are par excellence rationalizations of ad
hoc attitudes. Essentially they are weapons employed for diplo-
matic purposes. Every country uses those particular alleged prin-
ciples of international law which at any given moment suit its
convenience.' He continued: 'For purposes of casuistry the invo-
cation of some alleged principles of [international law] may be
expedient. And if in a spirit of deliberate partisanship you were
thus to evoke such alleged principles, on the basis that a desira-
ble end justifies the use of any means, and that the only test of
the propriety of such 'reasoning' is one's getting away with it,
then I could understand you. But I do not understand your high
moral indignation when someone, blowing away the gossamer of
legalism, scrutinizes and criticizes the non-legal postulate which
bottoms your discussion. The real test of the views you express in
your letter to Morris Ernst is this: Would you be in favor of ap-
plying the same alleged principles of international law regard-
less of the consequences to the people of the United States?
Frankly (the world being what it is today) I must say that I
would not. Cohen promptly replied. 'What you say about the haz-
iness of international law may be true in many fields, but on the
main point of the report we were dealing not with theory but
with the historical practice of the United States and other na-
tions respecting foreign insurrections. We were dealing with
brute facts and showing how habits developed in one situation
were thrown over in another situation, to the great gratification
of Mr. Franco, who publicly expressed his appreciation of the em-
bargo.' Frank held his ground. 'My fundamental point is not that
there is what you call 'haziness' in international law,' he wrote.
My basic point is that the so-called principles of international
law are applied, or not applied, in particular instances, in accor-
dance with what a particular country considers, at the particular
moment, to be for the welfare of its citizens. Consequently, any
given so-called principle of international law is often applied by
any given country to one set of facts in one part of the world and
not applied to what might seem to be a similar set of facts in
another part of the world. Not to recognize that such is the man-
ner in which so-called international law is always applied is to
ignore the facts of life.
Dan Ernst, Legal Realism and International Law, 1938, LEGAL HISTORY BLOG,
(June 22, 2008, 01:OOAM), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2008/06/legal-real-
ism-and-international-law.html.
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Another reason policy science may be more conducive to inter-
national law is the much greater focus in the study of international
law on norm or law creation than in most of domestic law courses.
Norm creation in international law takes place within and among
United Nations bodies and agencies, regional organizations, in the
works of special rapporteurs, nongovernmental organizations, and
states. The formation of these norms in custom and treaties includes
consideration of what states and these other bodies do, and why they
do it. This is much more congenial to a policy science approach of look-
ing at the behavior of decision makers and policymaking. 3 °
Professor McDougal taught that the international law making
process is ongoing and evolving.1 3 ' For McDougal, however, interna-
tional law is a study separate from politics and includes a variety of
components and actors that can be gleaned from how it actually oper-
ates, affects decisions, and creates norms. McDougal asserted that the
view that international law was nothing but politics was dangerous
because it could lead to the assertion that mere exercise of power could
hammer out international law. 13 2 Dangerous or not, since World War
130 But if our focus in domestic law courses was on how criminal laws are made,
how and why people enter into contracts, how and why we structure our tort sys-
tem the way it is, and so on, policy science would make more sense there too. For
instance, we imagine it would work well in a course on the legislative process.
However, the policy science approach is more difficult and controversial to imple-
ment during adjudication and in courses that focus on the outcomes of adjudica-
tion. Although, one cannot deny the insights of the realists that what judges do in
cases is not merely a matter of following doctrine and legal rules, most recognize a
difference between the rule creation stage when laws are passed and contracts are
negotiated, and the adjudication stage, when those "laws" are "applied." While
there is still plenty of room for policy choice and law making during adjudication,
most jurists would view their choices, or at least the sources and modes of argu-
ment that they use to justify their choices, as being more constrained in the adju-
dicatory context. The modes of argument and justifications are at the very least
different. Policy science modes of argument would not be as at home in a judicial
decision as they would be in a discussion about how best to design a criminal code
or to protect endangered species, etc. A full blown Policy Science approach to a
given case would not only be too difficult, it would also not look like a legitimate
judicial decision to the bulk of the legal community. Note also that even states
may not engage in the inclusive decision procedure specified by the McDougal-
Lasswell Policy Science. See SHAW, supra note 34, at 61 (stating states seldom
engage in extensive behavioral analysis).
131 See SHAW, supra note 34, at 59 (arguing that international law for McDougal-
Lasswell Policy Science is a constantly evolving process of decision making).
132 See Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Law Making: Reflections on
the New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 393, 394, 396-98
(2007) (citing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that international law does not constrain and is there-
MCDOUGAL-LASSWELL POLICY SCIENCE
II, there has also been a substantial presence of this realist school,
which sees states acting in their interest defined as power uncon-
strained by law.133 Neo-conservatives may contend that international
law not only is, but should be, nothing but a ramification of political
power,134 but New Haven School adherents reject this view. For
them,135 international law has a broad interactive political component.
Thus, international law is composed of many sources, action and reac-
tions, but is much more than nation states acting in their self
interests. 136
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is interesting that the domestic critique of policy science has
not led to its rejection in the International Law arena. Here are some
distinguishing characteristics of the domestic arena, as compared to
the international arena, that may explain this paradox. The transpo-
sition of policy science to International Law need not have the goal of
eliminating the cost effective large class in which the legal positivist
approach is taught. The bulk of the required curriculum can be taught
in this efficient rule based way, leaving the few International Law
courses to be taught as small seminars that can delve into policy sci-
ence. Nor need student expectations that there is law out there to be
taught be defeated for the same reason; International Law is not a
required course. A deeply ingrained mythology exists that there is law
in the domestic arena. International Law may lack this agreed-upon
base. Furthermore, International Law experts have no firm basis or
agreed-upon vantage point to reject New Haven School theory. The
shifting sands of international law do not challenge the legitimacy of
International Law elites. In the United States domestic sphere, how-
fore a mere tool of a strong state); Minda, supra note 51, at 435-36 (arguing that
international law is seen by policy science advocates as a means to transform the
world into liberal democracies).
133 See Paul SchiffBerman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J.
INT'L L. 301, 301 (2007) (asserting that positivism and realism have been domi-
nant since World War II in international law).
134 See Levit, supra note 132, at 394 (stating, "[i]nternational law is now besieged
by a neo-conservative, nationalist ideology, an ideology hauntingly similar to the
Cold War realism of the 1950s and 1960s, that gives little (if any) independent
normative weight to international law and instead conceives of it as a mere tool in
furtherance of the 'national interest' and power politics.").
135 See Bratspies, supra note 44, at 389 (arguing that the global community is
composed of numerous sources contributing to international law).
136 See Suzuki, supra note 93, at 30.
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ever, if law is politics, narrowly conceived, judges may have no more
legitimacy than politicians. 137
Neither liberals nor conservatives in the United States want
law and politics to be inextricably linked in the domestic judicial pro-
cess. Law training and judicial experience must count for some-
thing.13" Hence, the Legal Positivist mythology that courts find
domestic law from sources such as constitutions, cases and statutes,
largely exclusive of policy, has carried the day and contributed to the
demise of policy science in the domestic United States. McDougal and
Lasswell assumed that Legal Positivist myth and obfuscation could be
defeated by policy clarification. To accomplish a significant move in
that direction, positivism on the domestic level must be jettisoned and
a cumbersome reorientation of current legal education must be
adopted. Maybe someday people can be told that McDougal and Lass-
well were correct: decision-makers often make their decisions on a pol-
icy basis. But positing high-level abstractions as a means of resolving
these policy issues is a process about which we reserve an overarching
skepticism.
V. EPILOGUE
Our purpose has not been to denigrate the New Haven School.
We affirm that law predominantly involves a choice of policy and that
positivism is a smokescreen to cover up that policy choice. The New
Haven School, which takes a global perspective, is applauded particu-
larly in international law. We also favor the expansion of the focus of
international law to include actors other than states. The New Haven
School's view of law as a process, rather than a snapshot of a set of
rules and principles, is also desirable. Where we part company is the
New Haven School's focus on a multitude of goals as supplemented by
an exhaustive list of policies that does little to aid the indeterminacy
problem. 139
We also fear that emphasis on liberal values, while laudable,
calls for much more thinking about how, if at all, communication can
137 The trust of the people in their federal and state government officials is, unfor-
tunately, quite low. A 2010 Gallup poll found that only thirty-six percent of Amer-
ican have a great deal or fair amount of trust and confidence in the legislative
branch of government, The executive branch scored slightly better with forty-nine
percent and the Judiciary faired the best with sixty-six percent. Frank Newport,
Trust in Legislative Brach Falls to Record-Low 36%, GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/143225/trust-legislative-branch-falls-record-low.aspx.
138 For example, Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn stressed "craft" in judging, which
presumably elevates the judicial process above mere politics. See KARL N. LLEW-
ELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 363-68 (1962).
139 Falk, supra note 15, at 2000-01.
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resolve conflict and diametrically opposed premises, which do not even
include dialogue to some. We wish the New Haven School good luck,
but remain deeply skeptical of the methodologies chosen so far.
